Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to administer industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new philosophy looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

423 474 661 425 policy was now changed and the middle and the richer peasants were grouped together and opposed to the poor peasants. This multiplied enormously the hostile and unsympathetic elements of the population but by holding out tempting offers to the poor peasants, the Communists succeeded in fanning anew the flames of class hatred in the villages and in producing the desired effects.

[651] Along with the adoption of the Five Year Plan, the All-Union Congress called for the strengthening of attempts at collectivization. As a result, the amount of grain demanded and the amount of taxes were rapidly raised with the avowed purpose of ruining the kulaks and kurkuls, as they were called in Ukraine. Increased pressure was put upon all classes of the rural population to join collective farms and in some districts this was so effective that almost seventy per cent of the land was turned over for organization on a "voluntary" basis.

As a further step in the same direction there began in 1928 and also in 1929 a furious attack on the richer and middle peasants and a growing insistence on the need of "dekurkulizing" the villages. This meant nothing more or less than the elimination from the countryside of all those people who had prospered under the New Economic Policy. The property of the richer and more prosperous peasants was completely confiscated and they with their families were deprived of all their rights, often including the house where they had lived or the shacks into which they could crawl for shelter. With superb inhumanity the Bolsheviks would drive formerly wealthy peasants and their families from their homes in the middle of winter and leave them without food or clothing and would threaten any of their relatives or friends who dared to give them any relief.

In the first stages of the process, cases were known where some of these richer people were moved out of the Ukraine with their goods and cattle, but as the Communists settled down to their work, they simply seized everything for their own use and that of the collective farms and contented themselves with shooting or deporting their enemies, often to the far north for work in the

forests or to northeastern Siberia for work in the mines and in the more remote parts of the wilderness.[1]

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1 A graphic account of this dekurkulization was given in a DP camp by Sh., a former peasant of the district of Kharkiv:

"On May 22, 1929, all my property, tools, cattle, building and clothing were confiscated. I and my family (my wife, six small children and my mother), were left without means of livelihood; we stayed with people like old folks, ate what we were given, although people were forbidden to give to us. On November 27, in spite of the fact that there was snow on the ground and 15 degrees of frost, I and my entire family, without clothes and half-naked, were put out of the house. Until February, 1930 I lived in another house which was half fallen down. On February 28, I, my wife and six children (my mother had disappeared; I do not know where) were arrested and with other dekurkulized persons were sent to the railroad station. There we were packed into freight cars as sardines in a barrel and travelled for 11 days, without knowing our destination. We were fed once every two days. Many perished from cold and exhaustion. We finally reached the station of Makarikha near Kotlas, district of Archangel, and in 40 degrees of frost, we were detrained in the woods in the snow.

"Then all those able to work were driven to forest operations 300 kilometers from Kotlas. They drove us half shod in the intense cold. They fed us on the way 300 grams of bread, 5 grams of barley and 3 grams of salt per person a day. Many died on the way. Many, unable to walk further, were shot on the spot. There we cut wood and they treated us very badly. The norms of work were abnormally high. We lived in huts which were holes we dug ourselves. Of the many thousands of people who came there more than half died of exhaustion, hunger and cold.

"Of the members of the families of kurkuls who remained at the station of Makarikha, more than half froze. Among these were my sons Ivan and Fedir; a third son Hryhory died of exhaustion. Later all the children up to 14, including three of mine, were returned to Ukraine but I have no further news of them. They probably perished. In 1932, first my wife and then I escaped by hiding in cars loaded with wood. I found work in the Don Basin. In 1937 my wife was arrested suddenly and shot in the prison of Artemivsk in the Don Basin. I escaped because I was living under an assumed name. Now I am a DP and living in Germany in an IRO camp."

423 They followed this up at the end of 1929 by providing for the
474 compulsory collectivization of all the land. Private holding of land
661 was abolished and so was private use. The peasants were forced
● 425 into collective farms to which they had to contribute all of their livestock, agricultural implements and tools. Then they were left nothing that they could call their own except a small garden plot that was assigned to each family for the purpose of raising those types of vegetables that it was not profitable to raise in large quantities, because the collective farms were occupied with those types of agriculture that were selected for them by the central authorities in Moscow.

The immediate result differed in different places. In Great Russian territory, where the principle of the community ownership of land had definitely taken root, the peasants complied without too much hesitation. In Ukraine and Kuban, where the older style of Ukrainian agriculture had been long in vogue, the peasants became sulky. They killed off large numbers of their cattle and livestock of various kinds. The government, seeing this tremendous loss, then tried to eliminate from the collectives and liquidate in one way or another all of those who had been guilty of disobedience to the order requiring the peasants to contribute all their wealth.

There developed almost a civil war in some sections of the country as discontent rose and the peasants were prepared to die rather than to yield. Nevertheless, this time the government was not prepared to concede anything, as it had in 1921, and despite remarks by Stalin that in some details the Communists had become dizzy from success, the regime held its course and even continued to apply the screws more tightly. The result was the famine of 1932 and 1933.

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

421 Land tenure in the Ukraine is at present in an
●425 unstable state. The principal factors affecting it are two legal enactments, the first being the law of 1861 abolishing serfdom and providing for the ownership of land by peasants, who previously had held none, and the second being the Stolypin law of 1906 modifying the principle of communal ownership in peasant lands. The law of 1861 provided for land to be taken from private estates and handed over to peasants on a deferred purchase system. The land was not assigned to individuals, but to *mirs* (local communes), which divided it up for cultivation. The law also provided for periodical redistributions of this land, which is known always as the *nadyel* or endowment land. At the present time a good deal of *nadyel* land in the Governments of Poltava and Chernigov is held by individual peasant owners, but elsewhere it is all owned by communes. A peculiar principle of this system is the mutual responsibility of all members of the commune for its legal and financial obligations, even should a member have forsaken the locality and the practice of agriculture.

425 The great defect of the distribution of 1861 is that
511 it is based on the rural population of that date, with no machinery for providing additional land in proportion to the natural increase of population, which has been very rapid. Two evil results have followed. First, at the periodical redistributions of *nadyel* land the amount available per head has steadily decreased. The holdings have therefore tended to become uneconomical, and a consequent impoverishment of the peasants has taken place, with the natural concomitants of arrears of rent and taxes and an increased burden of debt on the land. Secondly, efforts to purchase or rent further land from private proprietors, in order to increase the available *nadyel* land or supply the wants of prosperous peasants who wish to buy new farms, has led to an enormous increase in the price and rent of land, a rise of three times being frequent and a tenfold rise occasional. To

alleviate these conditions various measures have been adopted, such as the easement or complete extinguishing of the burden of the purchase-price of the *nadyel*, the prevention of its frequent redistribution, and the founding of the Peasants' Land Bank by the State to facilitate further purchases of land by the communes. Nevertheless, a result not looked for by the framers of the law abolishing serfdom has followed, namely the creation of a large landless agricultural proletariat, which tends to sink in the social scale, to live partly by industry in the towns, and to be migratory in its habits.

The law of 1906 introduced for the first time the general principle of individual and permanent ownership of *nadyel* lands. It aimed at the breaking up of the *mirs* as no longer fulfilling a need, in the expectation that security of tenure by the individual would lead to a more rational and successful system of cultivation. The period since the promulgation of the law is too short to allow of sound conclusions as to its effect.

The *nadyel* lands are almost entirely cultivated on the three-field system, each unit of land being planted one year with a winter-sown grain, the following year with a spring-sown grain, and lying fallow in the third year. This method causes a disastrous impoverishment of the land, especially as in many cases the minimum of manure, whether animal or chemical, is used. An alternative method must be introduced, or the productiveness of the black-soil land under peasant ownership will continue to shrink as heretofore.

The land held by private owners is in general their perpetual freehold, and can be roughly divided into that held by the nobility in large estates and the smaller holdings purchased from them since the abolition of serfdom by prosperous peasants and others desirous of embarking on agriculture on their own account. There are also a number of foreign colonists, chiefly Germans, descendants of those introduced into the country

9; Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

425 by the Government at various times between the middle of the eighteenth century and 1861, in the hope that their superior methods of agriculture would be copied by other cultivators. This effect, however, was not produced, and the colonists form compact communities with little or no influence on their neighbours. Land in private ownership is usually farmed on more modern and rational principles than the *nadyel* land, and produces almost the entire surplus of cereals which is sent abroad and to other parts of Russia. [241]

421 The land owned by the Church, Crown, and members of the Imperial family is absolute freehold, and is generally well managed and productively farmed.

407 412 Up-to-date agricultural machinery is becoming more common all round. It is of course most in vogue on the large estates, especially in the case of expensive machines involving the use of power; steam-ploughs on the cable system are much in use on the large sugar-beet estates, and tractor ploughs with single engines are becoming numerous. By the help and enterprise of the *zemstvos* the peasants are now beginning to use modern machines and implements. The traditional *sock* or wooden plough, the flail, and other such primitive tools are disappearing, although it is hard to induce the peasant to abandon his old methods.

(c) *Forestry*

137 [311] A large portion of the Ukraine is totally denuded of trees at the present time. The Governments of Podolia and Volhynia, and the northern parts of Kiev and Chernigov, are well wooded, the area covered by forest being about 15 per cent. of the whole. In the remaining provinces the forest area averages 3–4 per cent. of the total. The State controls certain areas north of Kiev on both banks of the Dnieper, and in Volhynia on the south side of the Pripet marshes, as well as smaller scattered tracts in Podolia. In the Government of Yekaterinoslav the State has lately done much

241 It is almost unbelievable that in many regions of the steppe the planted surface is not ploughed up, or in any case only superficially with a land-parer. The purpose is to conserve soil moisture. Often the entire sowing, the entire spring work of the farmer consists of a single process. A light land-parer scratches the surface; it has a box attached to it containing the seed, and the harrow is attached to this "ploughing and sowing machine". With this type of sowing one necessarily reaps a lot of weeds.

243 438 Nevertheless, before the war the Ukraine enjoyed the reputation of being a granary. During the years 1909 to 1913 the country produced on an average of 8.6 million more tons of grain annually than it consumed. The annual export amounted to /144/ an average of 4.3 million tons of wheat alone and 2.7 million tons of barley. (87) Surplus and export dropped considerably

87. Kubiyovich: Geography of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 390.

under Bolshevik rule. In 1934 only one million tons of grain were exported.

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425 669 In 1917, when the Bolsheviks became active, the general feeling in North and Central Ukraine was extremely favorable to an agrarian revolution. The land-hungry peasants were deeply convinced of the fact that the "right of the landowner was an injustice". Whoever promised the peasants that they were to receive all the land they could themselves cultivate, had won them over to his cause. As a matter of fact, in 1917, at the beginning of the revolution, the lands of the estate owners and the large farmers were immediately divided up, in the process of which the estates often went up in flames and

425 669 the cattle were burned. However, the glorious state did not last long. The farmers lacked seed, machines and draft animals in order to cultivate the land they so easily obtained. Besides, the men who came back from the war and the landless village farmers wanted to have a share in the booty. In the guberniyas of Kiyev and Khar'kov the government claimed the forests and the extensive beet fields. Civil wars, drought and epidemics carried off hundreds of thousands of peasant families during the years of the Bolshevist war. Thus ended the first chapter of the agrarian revolution, so eagerly awaited.

423 241 The New Economic Policy with its tolerance of a "bludgeoned private economy" constituted the second chapter. The peasants obtained their land and their farms on long leases; they could cultivate their land as they pleased, except that the farm could not be carelessly run, otherwise the management of the establishment could pass over into other hands. Nothing was gained by the fact that all the land belonged to the community. The "communal fields" were a Russian form of possession which had found favor at the time of Catherine II in the steppes and in the part of the Ukraine on the left bank of the river. Even though the farmer could not dispose of his land 497 at any time like a free /Facing page 144/ /Map IX: Railroad Communications. The main lines of communication run in a north-south direction, whereas the east-west lines have always been neglected./ /Key: Number of daily passenger trains 423 in 1935./ /145/ estate owner, even though he was 241 obliged to acquiesce to the fact that the entire community property was redistributed every 10 to 20 years, nevertheless, he could do as he pleased on his section of land. No less than 88.9% of peasant land in the Ukrainian steppes belonged to the communities, and in North Ukraine, 80.4%. The czars had condoned this form of ownership, because it simplified administration, facilitated

the prescribed price.

According to ideas in Moscow, the score had to come out even. It could not be difficult at last to introduce more modern agricultural methods along with the collective farms. The tractors, it was believed, would surely bring it about. However, Moscow made its figures without consulting the Ukrainian farmer whose individualistic bent and stubborn adherence to private property were to cause the equalizers the worst difficulties imaginable.

Collectivism began in the year 1928 with wonderful promises. In 1929 only 2% of the planted surface of the Ukraine was communal and cultivated according to a plan. In other words, there was resistance along the whole front! Now extortionate taxation was applied. Unlimited taxation in money and grain made the peasants ripe for the "voluntary" adoption of the collective. Hotbeds of resistance were exterminated. There was now no turning back in this agrarian revolution from above, for the Five Year Plan was at stake. A Ukrainian victory would have had incalculable consequences for Moscow. Not in vain had the Muscovites been trained from the time of Ivan the Terrible and particularly by Peter the Great and Catherine to break down stubborness. The methods which the Bolsheviks now used to assert their will were old; it was only the technique that was new.

Compulsory collectivism on a large scale began in 1929 with the suppression of free sales of products from the individual farms with the removal of surplus and with political persecution. There was almost nothing left over from the 1929 harvest. Planting in 1930 was inadequate, for the work of those who were exiled had to be added to the regular work. In 1931 conditions worsened. The lack of draft animals was simply catastrophic, for the farmers had /147/ slaughtered all the cattle that should have been

474 given to the collective without compensation. The
425 country people carried on sabotage wherever possible. The Bolsheviks retaliated with relentless and merciless war. The Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Skrypnyk complained in July 1932 at the Party Conference in the presence of Molotov and Kaganovich: "Absolutely everything has been taken away from us. That is why we are without bread, that is why we are suffering from hunger." (89) There was not enough manpower to bring in

89. Visti for July 11, 1932.

the harvest, so the authorities combed the streets of the cities and forthwith transported in trucks to the villages everyone who could not give a satisfactory account of himself. The gipsy bands - some of them had German passports - escaped toward the west. In the spring of 1933 famine took its toll of countless peasant families in one of the most fertile regions of the earth, and those that remained alive nourished themselves on roots and grass or fled into the cities of stone and wood in order to find bread there. According to accounts of the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, Kosior, at the Party Conference in Kiyev, about 300 million pood of grain was lost in the 1932 harvest, because it was not harvested but it rotted in the fields or at the collection centers. (90) For a long time now it

90. Kovalevskyj: Chervony Terror na Ukraini, p. 123 ff./Red Terror in the Ukraine/

was not the individual farmers who practiced sabotage in order to escape the collective, it was the Kolkhoz (collective farms) themselves that bitterly resisted Moscow's demands. The Ukrainian communists and Soviet officials were

474 accused of collaboration in preventing the ware-
housing of grain. As early as December 6, 1932
425 the Council of the People's Commissars came to
the following decision: "The resistance of
those communists who in reality have become leaders
of the sabotage, as well as the passive and fav-
orably disposed attitude of various Party organi-
zations toward this sabotage shall be liquidated."
(91)

91. Salisnyak: "The Struggle Between the Ukraine and Moscow in the Soviet Union" Nation und Staat, July-November, 1937.

In 1933, after a four-year struggle, the resistance of the Ukrainian people against that new order which seemed to the Muscovites to be the purpose of the state, was broken. Moscow, /148/ without any regard for the victims among its opponent, had fought a hard battle of nationalities and won. The Communist of December 11, 1934 gives a faint picture of the extent of this catastrophe when it reports that during the period of collectivization 200,000 Ukrainian farms were destroyed and their owners along with their families were exiled to North Russia.

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563 The Bolshevik agrarian revolution with all its consequences also did not spare the descendants of those German emigrants who had moved to the Ukraine between 1789 and 1842. The promise of abundant arable land and freedom of religious worship had at one time attracted these sectarians to this country. They were industrious, capable people who rapidly increased their possessions and multiplied. In 1914 there were 600,000 of them in the region of the Black Sea, 100,000 in the North Caucasus and 200,000 in Volhynia,

Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The principal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Ismail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Ismail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.